Obstruction of Justice, Constitutional Laws Broken, and U.S. Codes

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Trumps Insanity for the Week of May 2017

1. Fired FBI Director JAmes Comey who was investigating Trump
2. Admitted Obstruction on TV, by telling Russian embasador Comey was a "Nut Job"
3. Russians in the Oval Office
4. Asked Comey to Stop Investigation
5. Knew Flynn was under Investigation and still hired him.
6. Raqqa Attacked Aborted due to Flynn being on payroll of Turkey who didn't want the attack.But that is where ISIS is located one of their facilities.
7. Tape of Paul Ryan "Putin pays Trump" He admitted obstruction to Ryan.
8. He violates the constitution by getting 67 trademarks approved by China for his company recently have becoming president, which is an abuse of power.


Here are cold hard facts regarding many of the above allegations of White House conduct.
I really think Trump who is a pathological liar can do anything he wants for his own financial gain.

Cornell University Law School cites U.S. Code example of

18 U.S. Code § 1521 - Retaliating against a Federal judge or Federal law enforcement officer by false claim or slander of title

Current through Pub. L. 114-38. (See Public Laws for the current Congress.)

US Code
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Whoever files, attempts to file, or conspires to file, in any public record or in any private record which is generally available to the public, any false lien or encumbrance against the real or personal property of an individual described in section 1114, on account of the performance of official duties by that individual, knowing or having reason to know that such lien or encumbrance is false or contains any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or both.
(Added Pub. L. 110–177, title II, § 201(a), Jan. 7, 2008, 121 Stat. 2535.)

This passage would apply to Trump relative to his slanderous comments about the Federal judge who block his attempt at banning Muslim’s coming into the United States along with other countries. When he made slanderous and derogatory comments about the Federals Judges from Hawaii, Virginia and other states violated this statute.

28 CFR 0.89a - Delegations respecting claims against the FBI.

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§ 0.89a Delegations respecting claims against the FBI.
(a) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is authorized to exercise the power and authority vested in the Attorney General under the Act of December 7, 1989, Public Law 101-203, 103 Stat. 1805 ( 31 U.S.C. 3724), with regard to claims thereunder not exceeding $50,000 in any one case.
(b) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is authorized to redelegate to the General Counsel of the FBI or his designee within the Office of the General Counsel or to the primary legal advisors of the FBI field offices, any of the authority, functions, or duties vested in him by paragraph (a) of this section and by 28 CFR 0.172. This authority shall not be further redelegated.
[Order No. 884-80, 45 FR 22023, Apr. 3, 1980, as amended by Order No. 1417-90, 55 FR 27808, July 6, 1990; Order No. 1551-91, 56 FR 64192, Dec. 9, 1991; Order No. 1904-94, 59 FR 41242, Aug. 11, 1994; Order No. 2314-2000, 65 FR 44683, July 19, 2000; AG Order No. 3330-2012, 77 FR 26183, May 3, 2012]

In this statute the director of the FBI Comey can redelegate his case against Trump to the General Councel of the FBI.

1736. Inchoate Obstruction Of Justice Offenses


Several of the obstruction of justice provisions prohibit "endeavors" to obstruct. Section 1503 of Title 18, United States Code, prohibits "endeavors" to tamper with jurors and officers of the court. The omnibus clauses of sections 1503 and 1505 prohibit "endeavors" to obstruct justice as well as actual obstructions of justice. Section 1510 of Title 18, United States Code, prohibits "endeavors" to obstruct criminal investigations through bribery.
Although "endeavor" might be thought of as a synonym for "attempt," the Supreme Court has concluded that "endeavor" is broader than "attempt." United States v. Russell, 255 U.S. 138 (1921). In Russell, the Supreme Court held:
The word of the section is "endeavor," and by using it the section got rid of the technicalities which might be urged as besetting the word "attempt," and it describes any effort or essay to accomplish the evil purpose that the section was enacted to prevent . . . . The section . . . is not directed at success in corrupting a juror but at the "endeavor" to do so. Experimental approaches to the corruption of a juror are the "endeavor" of the section.
Id. at 143. Accord Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 333 (1966). See also United States v. Tedesco, 635 F.2d 902 (1st Cir. 1980) (court rejected defendant's argument that an explicit offer of a bribe or a request for specific testimony was required for an endeavor to influence a witness under section 1503), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981); United States v. Fasolino, 586 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1978) (defendant's importuning of a third party to approach a Federal judge, whom the third party knew, on a pending sentencing matter constituted an endeavor). see generally United States v. Osborn, 385 U.S. at 332-33; United States v. Lazzerini, 611 F.2d 940, 941-42 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. Roe, 529 F.2d 629, 631-32 (4th Cir. 1975); United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1228-29 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 950 (1974); United States v. Missler, 414 F.2d 1293, 1306 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970); Knight v. United States, 310 F.2d 305, 307 (5th Cir. 1962) (per curiam). The legislative history of section 1510 indicates that Congress intended to incorporate this case law into that provision. H.R.Rep. No. 658, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1760, 1762.
It follows that an endeavor to obstruct justice need not be successful to be criminal. See, e.g., Osborn, 385 U.S. at 333; United States v. Bucey, 876 F.2d 1297, 1314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1004 (1989); United States v. Thomas, 916 F.2d 647, 651 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Barfield, 999 F.2d 1520, 1522 (11th Cir. 1993); United States v. Wood, 6 F.3d 692, 695 (10th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, factual impossibility, which arises when the defendant solicits a third party to obstruct justice and the third party is a government informant, is not a valid defense. See United States v. Osborn, supra and United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d at 1228-29.

1727. Protection Of Government Processes -- Omnibus Clause -- 18 U.S.C. 1505

The omnibus clause of 18 U.S.C. § 1505 parallels its counterpart in 18 U.S.C. § 1503 in language and purpose, and most of the law construing the latter is applicable to the former. Generally, a defendant may be found guilty under section 1505 if the government establishes that: (1) there was a proceeding pending before a department or agency of the United States; (2) the defendant knew of or had a reasonably founded belief that the proceeding was pending; and (3) the defendant corruptly endeavored to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which the proceeding was pending. United States v. Price, 951 F.2d 1028, 1030-31 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Sprecher, 783 F. Supp. 133, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
Like section 1503, the omnibus clause of 18 U.S.C. § 1505 requires a corrupt state of mind. See United States v. Browning, 630 F.2d 694, 700-01 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 988 (1981). See generally this Manual at 1723. But see United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 386 (D.C. Cir. 1991), in which the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed Poindexter's convictions under section 1505 because the term "corruptly," as used in this section, was unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant's conduct, which included preparing false documents and submitting them to Congress, as well as testifying falsely before Congress. In an apparent response to Poindexter, Congress enacted a clarifying amendment regarding obstructing Congress. Section three of the False Statements Accountability Act of 1996 amended 18 U.S.C. § 1515 by adding a new subsection defining the term "corruptly" as used in section 1505 to mean "acting with an improper purpose, personally or by influencing another, including making a false or misleading statement, or withholding, concealing, altering, or destroying a document or other information." Pub. L. No. 104-292, § 3, 110 Stat. 3459, 3460.
Section 1505 is constrained, like its counterpart in 18 U.S.C. §  1503, by the requirement that there be a pending proceeding. Some courts have applied the pending proceeding requirement in a relaxed manner. United States v. Schwartz, 924 F.2d 410, 423 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Leo, 941 F.2d 181, 199 (3d Cir. 1991). For example, in United States v. Fruchtman, 421 F.2d 1019, 1021 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 849 (1970), the Sixth Circuit held that the term "proceeding" is "of broad scope, encompassing both the investigative and adjudicative functions of a department or agency."
Other cases appear to impose a slightly stricter pending proceeding requirement that requires a formal act. See Rice v. United States, 356 F.2d 709, 713, 715 (8th Cir. 1966) (in a case arising under the non-omnibus portion of former section 1505, the court found the requisite proceeding and stressed that the intimidating act followed the filing of unfair labor charges with the Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board by the individuals who were intimidated).
Investigations by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) constitute a section 1505 proceeding. See United States v. Lewis, 657 F.2d 44, 45 (4th Cir.) (ploy to frustrate IRS effort to collect delinquent taxes), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1086 (1981); United States v. Vixie, 532 F.2d 1277, 1278 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (submission of false document in response to IRS subpoena); United States v. Persico, 520 F. Supp. 96, 101-02 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (endeavor to bribe IRS agent to influence IRS's criminal investigation of individual's tax liability). Similarly viewed are investigations by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, United States v. Sprecher, 783 F. Supp. at 164, and the United States Customs Service, United States v. Schwartz, 924 F.2d at 423. However, investigations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) are not section 1505 proceedings. United States v. Higgins, 511 F. Supp. 453, 455-56 (W.D. Ky. 1981); see also United States v. Scoratow, 137 F. Supp. 620, 621-22 (W.D. Pa. 1956) (FBI

Donald Trump is in direct violation of 1736. Inchoate Obstruction Of Justice Offenses as indicated above along with below regarding disclosure of confidential documents regardless of position.

1505. Covered Instruments -- 18 U.S.C. 1028

  1. Identification Document -- This term is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(1) to mean:
[A] document made or issued by or under the authority of . . . (a governmental entity) which, when completed with information concerning a particular individual, is of a type intended or commonly accepted for the purpose of identification of individuals.
The document must be issued by a government agency and must identify a particular person. Hence, the term does not cover certificates of title or registration for motor vehicles since such documents identify vehicles, not persons. The term includes blank documents. The phrase "which, when completed with information," is intended to include blank identification documents within the coverage of section 1028. The description of an identification document will normally include such identifying elements as an individual's name, address, date or place of birth, physical description, photograph, fingerprints, employer, profession, occupation, or any unique number assigned to an individual by a governmental entity. Whether a document is "intended" to identify an individual is determined by looking at the purpose for which the governmental agency issued it. Examples of such documents would be passports, alien registration cards, Justice Department credentials, etc. The term "commonly accepted" is intended to cover identification documents which may not have been intended to serve as an identification document when originally issued, but have, nevertheless, become such a document in common usage. Examples would be birth certificates, driver's licenses, social security cards, etc. However, "commonly accepted" does not require that the document be accepted for identification purposes under any and all circumstances, but rather that it is accepted in situations where a document of that nature would reasonably be accepted for identification purposes. Of course, an identification document can be both "intended" and "commonly accepted." Although an identification document is usually made of paper or plastic, the term may also include badges for law enforcement officers if such a badge has a unique number on it which is assigned to a particular officer for the purpose of identifying that officer. The term refers to a tangible document and not merely the information contained on such a document (e.g., a Social Security number by itself is not an identification document under 18 U.S.C. §  1028. However, the use of someone else's Social Security number, or a false one, with intent to deceive any person for the purpose of obtaining anything of value from such person may be in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 408(g)(2).) A Social Security card itself, however, is clearly an identification document under 18 U.S.C. § 1028. See United States v. Quanteros, 769 F.2d 968 (4th Cir. 1985).
  1. Document-Making Implement -- This term is defined in 18 U.S.C. §  1028(d)(3) to mean:
any implement or impression specially designed or primarily used for making an identification document, a false identification document, or another document-making implement.
It obviously includes plates, dyes, stamps, and molds and other "tools" used to make identification documents. Another example of a document-making implement could be a device specially designed or primarily used to produce a small photograph and assemble laminated identification cards. The term may also include any official seal or signature, or text in a distinctive typeface and layout that when reproduced are part of an identification document. In cases in which specialized paper or ink or other materials are used in the production of an identification document, those items would be document-making implements. The term does not, however, include office photocopying machines because such machines are designed for more general purposes (i.e., not "specially designed or primarily used for" making identification and false identification documents). However, persons who use such machines to manufacture false identification documents or who provide them to another for the same purpose could be guilty of other offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 1028.
Violations of First Amendment
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FIRST AMENDMENT
RELIGION AND EXPRESSION
RIGHTS OF ASSEMBLY AND PETITION
Background and Development
The right of petition took its rise from the modest provision made for it in chapter 61 of Magna Carta (1215).207 To this meagre beginning are traceable, in some measure, Parliament itself and its procedures in the enactment of legislation, the equity jurisdiction of the Lord Chancellor, and proceedings against the Crown by “petition of right.” Thus, while the King summoned Parliament for the purpose of supply, the latter—but especially the House of Com[p.1188]mons—petitioned the King for a redress of grievances as its price for meeting the financial needs of the Monarch, and as it increased in importance it came to claim the right to dictate the form of the King’s reply, until, in 1414, Commons declared itself to be “as well assenters as petitioners.” Two hundred and fifty years later, in 1669, Commons further resolved that every commoner in England possessed “the inherent right to prepare and present petitions” to it “in case of grievance,” and of Commons “to receive the same” and to judge whether they were “fit” to be received. Finally Chapter 5 of the Bill of Rights of 1689 asserted the right of the subjects to petition the King and “all commitments and prosecutions for such petitioning to be illegal.”208
Historically, therefore, the right of petition is the primary right, the right peaceably to assemble a subordinate and instrumental right, as if the First Amendment read: “the right of the people peaceably to assemble” in order to “petition the government.”209 Today, however, the right of peaceable assembly is, in the language of the Court, “cognate to those of free speech and free press and is equally fundamental. . . . [It] is one that cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all civil and political institutions—principles which the Fourteenth Amendment embodies in the general terms of its due process clause. . . . The holding of meetings for peaceable political action cannot be proscribed. Those who assist in the conduct of such meetings cannot be branded as criminals on that score. The question . . . is not as to the auspices under which the meeting is held but as to its purposes; not as to the relation of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects.”210 Furthermore, the right of petition has expanded. It is no longer confined to demands for “a redress of grievances,” in any accurate meaning of these words, but comprehends demands for an exercise by the Government of its powers in furtherance of the interest and prosperity of the petitioners and of their views on politically contentious matters.211 The right extends to the “approach of citizens or groups of them to administrative agencies (which are both creatures of the legislature, and arms of the executive) and to courts, the third branch of Government. Certainly the right to petition extends to all departments of the Government. The right of ac[p.1189]cess to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition.”212
The right of petition recognized by the First Amendment first came into prominence in the early 1830’s, when petitions against slavery in the District of Columbia began flowing into Congress in a constantly increasing stream, which reached its climax in the winter of 1835. Finally on January 28, 1840, the House adopted as a standing rule: “That no petition, memorial, resolution, or other paper praying the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, or any State or Territories of the United States in which it now exists, shall be received by this House, or entertained in any way whatever.” Because of efforts of John Quincy Adams, this rule was repealed five years later.213 For many years now the rules of the House of Representatives have provided that members having petitions to present may deliver them to the Clerk and the petitions, except such as in the judgment of the Speaker are of an obscene or insulting character, shall be entered on the Journal and the Clerk shall furnish a transcript of such record to the official reporters of debates for publication in the Record.214 Even so, petitions for the repeal of the espionage and sedition laws and against military measures for recruiting resulted, in World War I, in imprisonment.215 Processions for the presentation of petitions in the United States have not been particularly successful. In 1894 General Coxey of Ohio organized armies of unemployed to march on Washington and present petitions, only to see their leaders arrested for unlawfully walking on the grass of the Capitol. The march of the veterans on Washington in 1932 demanding bonus legislation was defended as an exercise of the right of petition. The Administration, however, regarded it as a threat against the Constitution and called out the army to expel the bonus marchers and burn their camps. Marches and encampments have become more common since, but the results have been mixed.
The Cruikshank Case.—The right of assembly was first before the Supreme Court in 1876216 in the famous case of United[p.1190]States v. Cruikshank.217 The Enforcement Act of 1870218 forbade conspiring or going onto the highways or onto the premises of another to intimidate any other person from freely exercising and enjoying any right or privilege granted or secured by the Constitution of the United States. Defendants had been indicted under this Act on charges of having deprived certain citizens of their right to assemble together peaceably with other citizens “for a peaceful and lawful purpose.” While the Court held the indictment inadequate because it did not allege that the attempted assembly was for a purpose related to the Federal Government, its dicta broadly declared the outlines of the right of assembly. “The right of the people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances, or for anything else connected with the powers or the duties of the National Government, is an attribute of national citizenship, and, as such, under the protection of, and guaranteed by, the United States. The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances. If it had been alleged in these counts that the object of the defendants was to prevent a meeting for such a purpose, the case would have been within the statute, and within the scope of the sovereignty of the United States.”219 Absorption of the assembly and petition clauses into the liberty protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment means, or course, that the Cruikshank limitation is no longer applicable.220
The Hague Case.—Illustrative of this expansion is Hague v. CIO,221 in which the Court, though splintered with regard to reasoning and rationale, struck down an ordinance which vested an uncontrolled discretion in a city official to permit or deny any group the opportunity to conduct a public assembly in a public place. Justice Roberts, in an opinion which Justice Black joined and with which Chief Justice Hughes concurred, found protection against state abridgment of the rights of assembly and petition in the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. “The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on national questions[p.1191]may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.”222 Justices Stone and Reed invoked the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for the result, thereby claiming the rights of assembly and petition for aliens as well as citizens. “I think respodents’ right to maintain it does not depend on their citizenship and cannot rightly be made to turn on the existence or non–existence of a purpose to disseminate information about the National Labor Relations Act. It is enough that petitioners have prevented respondents from holding meetings and disseminating information whether for the organization of labor unions or for any other lawful purpose.”223 This due process view of Justice Stone has carried the day over the privileges and immunities approach.
Later cases tend to merge the rights of assembly and petition into the speech and press clauses, and, indeed, all four rights may well be considered as elements of an inclusive right to freedom of expression. Certain conduct may call forth a denomination of petition224 or assembly,225 but there seems little question that no substantive issue turns upon whether one may be said to be engaged in speech or assembly or petition.
Footnotes
207 C. Stephenson & F. Marcham, Sources of English Constitutional History 125 (1937).
208 12 Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 98 (1934).
209 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1876) , reflects this view.
210 De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364, 365 (1937) . See also Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937) .
211 See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1961) .
212 California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972) . See also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913–15 (1982) ; Missouri v. NOW, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980) (boycott of States not ratifying ERA may not be subjected to antitrust suits for economic losses because of its political nature).
213 The account is told in many sources. E.g., S. Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Union, chs. 17, 18 and pp. 446–47 (1956).
214 Rule 22, para. 1, Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R. Doc. No. 256, 101st Congress, 2d sess. 571 (1991).
215 1918 Att’y Gen. Ann. Rep. 48.
216 See, however, Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868), in which the Court gave as one of its reasons for striking down a tax on persons leaving the State its infringement of the right of every citizen to come to the seat of government and to transact any business he might have with it.
217 92 U.S. 542 (1876) .
218 Act of May 31, 1870, ch.114, 16 Stat. 141 (1870).
219 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S 542, 552–53 (1876).
220 De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) ; Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) ; Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) ; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) .
221 307 U.S. 496 (1939) .
222 Id. at 515. For another holding that the right to petition is not absolute, see McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985) (the fact that defamatory statements were made in the context of a petition to government does not provide absolute immunity from libel).
223 Id. at 525.
224 E.g., United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954) ; Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1961) .
225 E.g., Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) .
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